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Freight exchanges are central to the logistics indus-
try, as they reduce empty runs and meet spot demands. 
To improve their efficiency in terms of automation and 
enhance trust between the participants, we propose a 
decentralized freight exchange implemented using pub-
lic blockchains. With our solution, we also address 
shortcomings of public blockchains, such as scalability 
and privacy. We present two artifacts: a general archi-
tecture for an electronic logistics marketplace (ELM) 
and a concrete implementation as the proof of concept 
for a freight exchange. The solution is implemented us-
ing two off-the-shelf public blockchains and a public 
distributed file system. Additionally, we investigate the 
implications for the general ELM model and show that 
an ELM based on a blockchain can be viewed as infra-
structure rather than a market participant. 
 
1. Introduction 
Truck transport is central to our industry, since, at least 
for the last mile, most freight is moved via trucks. In the 
European Union, around 20% of all truck kilometers are 
for empty runs [11]. Through this, up to €100 billion 
costs of unused capacity were generated in 2016 [33]. 
This also harms the environment, as hazardous green-
house gases are emitted unnecessarily while transport-
ing nothing. 
Freight exchanges (FX), which are ELMs [13], decrease 
these costs. These are used to quickly meet spot de-
mands for truckloads [7], allowing empty trucks to be 
loaded by providing digital blackboards on which ship-
pers can post their transportation demands and carriers 
can submit bids. FX are mainly involved in the arbitrage 
of services and not in their processing [12]. 
Land-transport margins are minimal (1.8%–5.7% in 
2018 [10]), and every intermediary, such as a FX, in the 
chain of transport further decreases these [47]. Key is-
sues with transportation reported in the literature [19] 
were reliance on the phone as the most important means 
of communication, difficulties in establishing trust with 
carriers, and reservations with central platforms due to 
privacy and neutrality concerns [12]. Trust between 
parties is a significant issue, since valuable freight is en-
trusted to a potentially unknown carrier, and freight theft 
is a serious problem [5] in FX. More than 60 FX exist in 
Europe. Connecting to all of them is expensive. Pay-
ments are usually made within 30–60 days, potentially 
causing liquidity problems for carriers as well as effort 
involved in chasing payments. 
Electronic logistics marketplaces should have provided 
the solution; however, many problems remain unre-
solved. Electronic logistics marketplaces are operated 
by technology providers (TPs) [46]. Addressing the 
above problems might be a task for the TP or a consor-
tium of market participants. Both solutions would add 
additional transaction costs. However, with public 
blockchains, a technology exists that can run transac-
tions autonomously through smart contracts [42] with a 
minimal ram-up cost increase for the participants, so 
TPs can be replaced with technology. However, public 
blockchains involve scalability and privacy issues [8, 
25, 34], which may explain why minimal research is 
conducted on FX running on blockchains. We aimed to 
close this research gap by answering the following re-
search questions: first, we aimed to develop an architec-
ture for a decentralized, robust, extensible, efficient, and 
scalable FX. Second, how can a FX be made public 
while maintaining the privacy of participants? Third, 
how can trust be created between participants? 
Our contribution comprises two artifacts created follow-
ing the design science research (DSR) approach. The 
first is an architecture for establishing an ELM on block-
chains that addresses the issues of scalability and pri-
vacy. As the second artifact, we evaluated the theoreti-
cal architecture via the creation and evaluation of a pro-
totype, generating valuable knowledge for a technical as 
well as a managerial audience. Creating and evaluating 
prototypes with DSR is common practice when investi-
gating blockchain solutions [3, 27, 32] but is new to 
ELMs, since no similar research has yet been published. 
Using blockchains enables us to extend the traditional 
model of ELMs with one that can be operated by un-
known and untrusted participants in open and closed 
configurations without a TP, thus making the ELM an 
infrastructure rather than a participant. 





The paper is structured following the related DSR 
guidelines [14]. First, we introduce prior work, discuss 
the research method used, describe the first artifact, and 
evaluate it with the second artifact and further examina-
tions. The paper ends with a discussion of the results and 
the conclusion. 
2. Background 
2.1. Electronic Marketplaces 
Much research has been conducted on electronic mar-
ketplaces (EMs) [15]. One of the first definitions of an 
EM was provided by Bakos [2]: an EM is “an interor-
ganizational information system that allows the partici-
pating buyers and sellers to exchange information about 
prices and product offerings.” Four phases can be dis-
tinguished in the interactions within an EM [36, 37]. A 
buyer obtains information about an offering that a seller 
provides in the information phase. The trading phase 
starts with the submission of an offer, may involve ne-
gotiation between the buyer and seller, and ends with a 
binding contract. The transaction ends in the settlement 
phase with the exchange of goods/services and pay-
ments. The after-sales phase “involves after-sales prod-
uct support, customer service, and evaluation of the 
transaction’s outcome” [36]. 
A specific EM concerned with logistics services is the 
ELM. An ELM consists of “shippers, carriers and tech-
nology providers” [46]. An ELM may be open to differ-
ent participants or closed (i.e., only open for a selected 
group) [15]. Most traditional FX are open ELMs [40], 
where an unlimited number of known and unknown par-
ticipants can interact [15] while mainly using single 
modes of transport without added services [45]. Closed 
ELMs frequently established for a certain industry in-
volve smaller groups where participants are known and 
connected, more information is exchanged, and collab-
oration occurs [15]. 
 
Figure 1 EM models [45] 
Wang explored [44-46] the characteristics of closed 
ELMs and categorized them into four types according to 
the connectivity structure between the participants. The 
centralized market represents an open ELM where par-
ticipants are coordinated via bidding and pricing sys-
tems. In the traditional hierarchical coordination, a ship-
per creates a private marketplace to serve their 
requirements. In the modified hierarchical coordination, 
one platform is used by several shippers to interact with 
carriers, and some collaboration between shippers al-
ready occurs. In the heterarchical network, much collab-
oration occurs between shippers with a significantly 
customized network design to meet the shippers’ re-
quirements. Wang states that the heterarchical network 
might provide the highest flexibility and efficiency [46], 
as it combines the strengths of open and closed ELMs. 
Schwind [38] highlights the limitations of current 
ELMs, stating that they mainly provide support in the 
information phase while omitting data concerning the 
participants and their financial solidity and offering poor 
data security. 
2.2. Blockchain 
Bitcoin [26], introduced in 2009, was the first commer-
cial blockchain with a protocol to transfer value via a 
distributed immutable ledger. Transactions are orga-
nized in blocks, created by miners, who must solve a 
computational problem to tamper-proof the chain. This 
mechanism, known as proof of work, is used as part of 
a consensus algorithm that results in only seven transac-
tions per second. 
Anyone can join a public permissionless blockchain 
[53]. However, private blockchains require participants 
to obtain authorization to enter them. Consensus can be 
achieved via proofs that are much more rapidly executed 
(e.g., proof of stake or practical Byzantine fault toler-
ance), but trust is required between the participants or 
between the participants and a central entity. Public 
chains [8] cannot be altered by a single entity, while this 
is mainly untrue for private chains. No trust between the 
participants is required, since the consensus algorithm is 
built for an environment with untrusted parties. 
Second-generation blockchains [51] enable the use of 
smart contracts [42], which are executed during block 
creation by the participants in the blockchain. Ethereum 
[6, 48] is the most important Turing-complete block-
chain of this type. Smart contracts must always produce 
the same results when run, since many miners execute 
them simultaneously to create blocks. Thus, no external 
state must be accessed, because this could lead to differ-
ent results for each execution. To add the external state 
to a smart contract, oracles [50] can be used. 
Newer generations of blockchains attempt to overcome 
the limits of scalability, such as the public IOTA [31] 
protocol, where transactions are linked via a directed 
acyclic graph data structure, called tangle, to achieve 
high throughput. Since no miners are involved, no fees 
are incurred. By continuously removing unwanted 
transactions, IOTA sacrifices some of its immutability 
for the sake of performance. 
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Blockchains are not well suited to store larger files such 
as freight documents. The InterPlanetary File System 
(IPFS) [4] is a distributed file system that allows decen-
tralized file storage. A property of this is the immutabil-
ity of files. Files are referenced by their hash value, so a 
file behind a certain address will always be the same. 
Ideas for using the IPFS as a store to offload data from 
the main chain were discussed [52]. Here, a custom 
blockchain is required, which would be counter to our 
goal to use standard components. Another approach to 
storing Internet of Things data in the IPFS as a side 
chain was conducted [1]. Ethereum and Monax were 
used as a consortium chain that enabled access to the 
data packages in the IPFS. However, the architecture is 
limited to a private blockchain, since the mechanism of 
updating the data might cause scalability problems. 
Privacy is an issue that still requires resolution in public 
blockchains. Since all nodes contain a copy of all data, 
no private information should be stored in them. We 
needed to investigate the metadata, such as the transac-
tions, the content that is part of the transactions, and the 
state stored on the chain. Much research was conducted 
concerning the metadata. Protocol extensions exist that 
require off-chain computation, third parties, much com-
putation, and coordination using, e.g., Hawk [22] or 
Enigma [54]. A set of algorithms called zero-knowledge 
proofs [30] allows one party to prove that they possess 
a secret without revealing it. This can be used to hide 
parts of transactions and enable complete anonymity. 
None of these can currently be executed efficiently on a 
smart-contract-enabled blockchain [8]. They also re-
quire a trusted setup, which the participants must accept. 
No research has been conducted on placing a FX on a 
blockchain. Since ELMs are a subset of EMs, we inves-
tigated their concepts. For example, Notheisen [27] cre-
ated a marketplace for used cars on a public blockchain 
to replace a central register with a decentralized solu-
tion. This included a component for trade as well as a 
register and a process for registration. Others seeking 
similar approaches in different fields of application fol-
lowed a schema using Ethereum as a main chain, with 
some adding a side chain [18, 20, 24, 28]; these lack 
scalability, because the requirement of being able to 
place many offers for one service request would not 
scale with the proposed architectures. Moreover, pri-
vacy is not well implemented, as the transactions can be 
tracked. More privacy-aware concepts [23, 41] exist that 
allow part of a sale or reviews to be anonymous; how-
ever, these systems require specialized blockchains or 
must be executed on private blockchains. Moreover, 
auctions [43] were implemented using a blockchain; 
however, scalability and privacy were not sufficiently 
addressed. 
3. Method 
The research was conducted following the DSR [17] and 
related guidelines [14]. This method was chosen be-
cause we aimed to develop a novel technical solution for 
decentralized organization of freight order allocation. 
We followed the guidelines for design science [17]: we 
introduced an architecture (model) for a ELM that could 
also be used in a more general sense for other service 
exchanges. To evaluate the validity of the architecture, 
we introduced a model instantiation as an additional ar-
tifact. 
The problem relevance is high. Currently, only central-
ized FX are available. Considering the negative effect of 
empty runs on the climate and the economy, a decentral-
ized FX might prevent some of these. Since no such FX 
currently exists, our approach might solve a crucial 
problem.  
Through the implementation, we conducted a design 
evaluation. In simulations, we calculated the cost of 
transactions and showed via a deductive process that the 
required privacy was achieved. We defined use cases 
that were tested using test scripts. Additionally, we val-
idated the scalability promises of the involved compo-
nents. 
Our research contribution is an architecture that can be 
applied to a FX as well as to other areas where multistep 
negotiations can be conducted independently of the ne-
gotiation result, which must remain private and immu-
table in a distributed ledger. We provided a blueprint on 
how to implement decentralized, scalable, open, and pri-
vacy-aware FX. We also investigated the consequences 
of using a blockchain on the ELM model. 
We ensured research rigor by following the DSR pro-
cess and principles and by using a structure suggested in 
the literature [14]. To validate the model, an instantia-
tion was created, which was additionally validated 
through automated tests. 
In DSR, design is a search process. Both artifacts were 
created through iterations. The insights from the model 
instantiation influenced the model adjustment to better 
fit the state of the problem environment, as described in 
the evaluation section. 
The results of this research are presented through this 
paper as well as through presentations to the beneficiar-
ies of this study in a managerial setting. 
4. Artifact Description and Architecture 
To verify whether a blockchain should be used, several 
similar decision models are available [29, 49]. A flow 
chart determines which blockchain to use, if any [49]. 
We store state, have multiple writers (our participants), 
and do not wish to trust a third party. Our writers are not 
known centrally and no trust exists between them. Since 
public verifiability is an important property of our archi-
tecture, we were guided to use a public blockchain. 
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The architecture was designed via an iterative process, 
regularly testing it with the prototype. We were guided 
by the design process for blockchains by Xu [51] to 
evaluate different options in the implementation, which 
then influenced the architecture. Layering the data store 
was also inspired by a literature study [16]. 
4.1. Architecture 
The ELM model [46] involves a shipper (S) who re-
quests a service and wishes to obtain offers from carriers 
(Cs). The S selects an offer and the C executes the ser-
vice. To authorize payments for the service, the service 
quality must be verified and reported back to the ex-
change. To achieve this, the ELM model must be ex-
tended to include a validator (V) who performs that role. 
In contrast to the ELM model, we replaced the TP with 
the blockchain. 
The data repositories are divided into three layers. The 
management layer maps the information phase, settle-
ment phase, and after-sales phase of the EM model [36, 
37]. The negotiation layer is used to store the process 
of establishing the contracts, mapping the negotiation 
phase of the EM model [37]. The binary large object 
(BLOB) store is used to securely store bulk data. 
The durability and cost decrease with each layer of data 
stores. In the first layer, the highest durability is re-
quired, because this is where the payments are made. No 
money should be lost. This will also be the most expen-
sive layer, as durability increases the storage price. For 
the other layers, some of the durability can be sacrificed, 
since the negotiation data is only important while the 
contract is unsigned, and data in the BLOB storage only 
needs to be downloaded once. Afterwards, it can be con-
firmed which data was available when the contract was 
signed. 
The management layer holds the signed contracts, the 
money, information about the Cs, and a repository with 
references to the negotiation layer. After the contracted 
services are conducted, payments should be released. 
Thus, the implementing blockchain technology requires 
the ability to execute smart contracts so that the pay-
ments can be released automatically without involve-
ment from the S, which requires the necessary infor-
mation to be available in this layer. Since the cost of 
storing data in this layer is high, the minimum amount 
of data is stored. The data in the management layer is 
organized in the following repositories: 
Signed contracts repository This holds the contracts. 
Its properties are payment amount, due date for the ser-
vice completion, C, S, and V. 
C/S/V repository This contains information about the 
Cs, Ss, and Vs. Its properties are unique identifier, pub-
lic key, name, and link to the BLOB store with further 
information. 
Service request repository list Here, Ss store refer-
ences to their service request lists in the negotiation 
layer. Cs use this as a root for their search for service 
requests. Its properties are unique identifier, owner, 
name, link to negotiation layer, and minimum deposit. 
Deposit repository Here, a C can deposit money for an 
S so that the S can collect the money in case of an ex-
ception in the service. Its properties are S, C, amount, 
and valid until. 
 
The negotiation layer stores the service requests and 
offers. The implementing technology must support the 
speed of data changes and have low operating costs be-
cause of the larger amount of data. Additionally, the ne-
gotiation layer is used to determine who can access the 
service request list. The repositories of the negotiation 
layer are as follows: 
Service request list This contains a list of service re-
quests from one or many Ss as well as the quotes from 
the Cs. A service request must contain all the infor-
mation necessary to enable a C to make a binding offer. 
Additional documents are references in the BLOB store. 
The list must be encrypted. The S can provide access to 
interested parties by providing the necessary key. The C 
sends encrypted quotes that only the S or, depending on 
the operation mode, the other Cs of the service request 
list can read. 
Service request list approval queue Here, the C can 
request access to a service request list by providing a 
public key. The S uses this to provide the encrypted ac-
cess keys to the service request list. The public key pro-
vided here is not required to be the same as that in the C 
repository. 
 
The last layer is the BLOB store for storing large data 
objects. These objects are referenced from the other lay-
ers. It must be possible to prove that the file stored in the 
BLOB store is the one referenced from the other stores. 
This implies that the files in the BLOB store must be 
immutable, as the references are immutable as a prop-
erty of a blockchain. The data here should be encrypted. 
One goal of this research was to develop a process with-
out media disruption to maintain low transaction costs. 
Therefore, the payment must also be conducted on the 
blockchain. Since native blockchain cryptocurrencies 
are often highly volatile [35], a more stable currency is 
required. Therefore, in this case, an optional token 
should be used that can be exchanged at a stable price 
for fiat money. 
The final component of the exchange is the client soft-
ware, which provides a user interface. 
 
Protocols 
The protocol is divided into the following categories: 
setup management, service request handling, contract 
management, and exception handling. 
Setup Management 
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Creation of a carrier, shipper, or validator If a new 
C, S, or V wishes to join the exchange, they must regis-
ter with the public registry. This is necessary to allow 
the participants to build trust between each other. This 
allows a C to prove successful contract executions, be-
cause only they can produce the matching public key of-
fered in their profile. 
Creation of a service request registry Service request 
registries can be only created by any S registered in the 
S repository, so that it is clear who created it. 
Service Request Handling 
Creating service requests The S adds a signed service 
request to one of its service request lists so that the 
origin of the request is provable. The request data de-
fines the exact information required to offer a price for 
the service. The request might also contain data to en-
hance collaboration between the participants, such as 
forecasts for further shipments. 
Each service request is valid for a certain time. It also 
has a deadline by which the service must be started and 
another by which it must be completed. The S also spec-
ifies the validator that must be used to validate the cor-
rect service execution. For a service exception, the S 
also specifies an amount the C must pay if they do not 
provide the service. 
Finding service requests The C can find service re-
quests by browsing the service request list repository. 
From there, they can check the service request lists for 
new service requests. 
Accessing a service request list and handshake To ac-
cess the service request list, a C must send a request to 
the service request approval queue. The request is en-
crypted with the public key of the S. This contains a 
newly generated public key that the C must use in this 
service request list as well as the unique identifier that 
the C used in the C repository. The S can now validate 
how much money the C deposited, who they are, and 
how many contracts they completed successfully. The S 
can then decide to send the C the address as well as the 
access key to the service request list in a message en-
crypted with the public key the C sent in this message 
exchange. 
Responding to a service request with a quote The C 
attaches one or more quotes to a service request en-
crypted with the public key of the S. The offers may 
have a date until which they are valid. 
Contract Management 
Accepting an offer The S selects a winning offer by 
sending a message to the service request list. The part 
showing that the service request is closed is visible to 
the participants of the service request list, while the part 
pointing to the documents with the service details is en-
crypted with the public key used in the service request 
list of the winning C. The S then creates a contract on 
the management layer containing a hash value that iden-
tifies the service request and the winning quote. This can 
be used later to prove which terms lead to the contract 
without exposing the data to the public. The S must also 
send tokens to the contract so that the contract is paid on 
completion regardless of whether the S remains solvent. 
Service completion and payment On service comple-
tion, the validator specified in the contract is called by 
the C or by other means (e.g., the service beneficiary or 
a GPS tracker on reaching the destination) to validate 
service completion. The validator confirms whether the 
service was conducted as specified. If the service was 
completed correctly, the validator triggers the service 
contract to release the funds to the SP. 
Exception Handling Trust between the participants can 
be achieved through both the immutability properties of 
blockchain and the risk management undertaken by both 
parties. For cases where the service was not executed as 
agreed, clear rules must be established to resolve the sit-
uation on chain to minimize transaction costs. The main 
idea behind our resolution strategy is for the C to deposit 
funds into the contract that can be withdrawn by the S 
in case of noncompliance with the contract. The amount 
of compensation is defined in the service request. Every 
party can precisely assess the financial risks they are 
willing to take. This also addresses the goal of creating 
trust between the participants. When the contract is not 
validated by the validator within the defined time frame, 
the S can claim the agreed amount from the funds de-
posited by the C through the smart contract. 
Similarly, the C can claim a payment if, for example, the 
S did not allow the C to provide the service. However, 
no automated process can be offered here, as it is impos-
sible to efficiently prove the misbehavior of the S on 
chain. Involving a third party would result in additional 
overheads and might not be an economically valid op-
tion. Therefore, the S must approve this claim. Since the 
whole interaction is stored on chain, it might benefit the 
S to approve a claim to earn the trust of other Cs. 
5. Evaluation 
The general design decision for the prototype was to 
build on standard components to support the reliability 
and stability goals and increase acceptance by the users. 
Ethereum is used for the management layer, as it is the 
most successful blockchain in terms of market capitali-
zation (coinmarketcap.com), supporting smart contracts 
Figure 2 The architecture of the ELM 
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and offering both high durability and reliable security 
[32]. The smart contracts were created using the Solidity 
language. As the internal currency, an ERC20-compli-
ant token was created to be compatible with public token 
exchanges. 
The remainder of the contracts on Ethereum is divided 
between the repositories, service request repository list, 
service contract handling, and exception handling, as 
specified in the general architecture. The repositories 
contain the handling of shippers, carriers, and oracles 
(validator) allowing self-registration. The data required 
for the registration is the name, IPFS address containing 
further description, and a public key (elliptic curve cryp-
tosystem [21] to save space compared to RSA). The ser-
vice request repository list contains the list of service 
request repositories, which each contain an owner, 
name, IOTA address of the service request repository, 
and a minimal amount that must be deposited to access 
the list. Any shipper can create such a list. The part re-
siding on Ethereum is governed by smart contracts, 
since financial transfers must be reliable and depend on 
the agreement between the parties and not their willing-
ness to cooperate. 
Ethereum alone cannot scale cost, speed, or volume. Be-
cause of its speed and scalability, resulting from its 
leaner approach to the consensus algorithm, we chose 
IOTA for the negotiation layer, as adding transactions 
to the tangle involves no direct cost. Since IOTA does 
not offer smart contracts, compliance with the rules is 
achieved through a protocol and encryption; IOTA of-
fers the second-layer masked authenticated messaging 
(MAM) protocol on top of the tangle, which is essen-
tially a linked list where messages are encrypted and 
signed. Anyone who has a seed key can add elements to 
these lists. 
The IOTA tangle contains the service request list ap-
proval queue and a service request list, which are used 
as described in the general architecture. To encrypt the 
service requests, the symmetric block cipher, advanced 
encryption standard (AES [9]), is used, so one key can 
be shared with all participants, since quote requests 
should be accessible to them, regardless of when they 
joined. The key is shared during the handshake, when a 
carrier is approved to join a service request list. 
A service request contains the minimal data required for 
a carrier to create a quote (e.g., a postal code but no con-
crete delivery address) and an ID that is unique to the 
list. A carrier might reply with a signed quote message 
encrypted with the public key of the shipper. 
To accept a quote, the shipper posts a message divided 
into two parts, one of which is unencrypted and shows 
the quote ID as well as the type of the message, notify-
ing the participants that no further quotes are required. 
The second part is encrypted and contains an IPFS ad-
dress pointing to an AES-encrypted BLOB (e.g., PDF 
document) with the detailed instructions for the carrier 
and the accompanying AES key.  
 The negotiation layer only enforces compliance in post-
ing service requests and quotes and enables the shipper 
to control who can participate in their section of the FX. 
At this point, incentives for compliance in executing the 
service must be set with the promise for payment. This 
is performed using the smart-contract-enabled 
Ethereum. In executing smart contracts, data storage is 
the most expensive component, since the data must be 
stored on every node participating in the blockchain. 
The minimal information that must be stored is how 
many tokens a shipper transfers to a carrier, which vali-
dator should be able to release it, and for how long this 
promise is valid as well as a reference to the quote re-
quest. Since the tokens are deducted from the shipper’s 
account, the carrier can be sure that they will be paid if 
they provide their service and persuade the validator to 
release the payment. The carrier cannot stop this process 
after filing this contract on the blockchain. 
 In our implementation, the validator is a service that 
creates a QR code (ISO/IEC 18004:2015) that the ship-
per can give to the receiver of the shipment. Once the 
shipment arrives, the receiver scans the QR code, which 
encodes a URL secured by a JSON web token (RFC 
7519), which then triggers the validator to release the 
payment on the blockchain. 
The IPFS is a distributed file system that offers immu-
tability and verifiability for a specific named resource, 
and it is free of charge, as it is peer-to-peer-based and 
therefore a good fit for the BLOB layer. 
Additionally, we created a web-based client (based on 
Java, Spring Boot, and Angular), which can be used by 
the parties to allow easier access to the blockchains (see 
Figure 3). In designing the web client, we also created 
57 automated tests to validate the functionality of the 
platform. To better understand how the platform can be 
used, we also created a complex demonstration setup 
Figure 3 The web client with the carrier, validator 
(oracle) registries, service request view, and, on the 
right, the summary of a shipment before it is signed. 
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with demonstration data to allow presentation of the re-
sults to a wider business audience as part of the DSR 
process. The web client is a stateless (the state is on the 
blockchain) multi-user application that can be run on the 
user’s computer. The remainder of the platform is exe-
cuted on the blockchain. The design goal of a decentral-
ized application is thus achieved. 
The platform was designed in several phases. First, we 
gathered business knowledge from our business partners 
through interviews. We then reviewed the literature on 
the state of the current research as well as searching the 
internet for solutions to the problem. This process led to 
an initial architecture artifact. Through the implementa-
tion, several changes in the initial architecture were re-
quired, as assumptions required revision. Particularly, 
the speed of Ethereum required us to minimize both the 
initial data model of the contract representation and the 
extension with IOTA. For the most used data structures 
in the management layer (contracts), we only stored IDs, 
and even the validity date was reduced to a number rep-
resenting the days since the FX creation. 
5.1. Scalability 
The next step to validating the architecture was to cal-
culate the cost of transactions on Ethereum, since only 
these incur direct costs. The contract creation and re-
lease of payments are most frequently used. Registra-
tions to the exchange as a C, S, or V would be mainly 
one-time operations. 
Table 1 Cost on Ethereum. Assumptions: slow exe-
cution 5 gwei, normal execution 10 gwei; based on 
ethgasstation.info, gitcoin.co/gas/history  
As shown in Table 1, the cost of handling a shipment 
would be around 0.07–0.14 €, depending on how fast we 
require the transactions to be processed. Moving one 
Euro-pallet from Berlin to Madrid costs around 150 € 
(price calculator at a logistics company); this would be 
around 0.05% of the cost that would be added through 
the FX. As a percentage, this amount appears minimal. 
Comparing the cost to that of self-hosting, where infra-
structure, servers, and personal maintenance must be 
paid for, this is minimal. Even creating the whole FX 
does not cost more than 7 EUR. From an economic 
viewpoint, the FX appears scalable. 
Scalability also depends on the blockchain capacity. 
Although the IOTA protocol should contain no limiting 
factors, we validated the promise of scalability. To add 
a new transaction to the network, a small proof of work 
must be computed by the client. We tested the scalabil-
ity with the largest piece of data from our protocol, the 
request for an offer, which is around  
500 bytes, and we sent it via the MAM protocol to the 
tangle. We utilized the Amazon Web Services cloud, 
sending 1,000 requests for offers to the tangle to deter-
mine whether the number of transactions per second in-
creased with the computing power. 
We correctly assumed that with more computing power, 
the number of transactions processed within a given 
time frame would increase almost linearly (Table 2). 
The IPFS is a distributed peer-to-peer file system. In 
contrast with the blockchains, the data is not stored by 
every node or client. The clients only help to find the 
data via a distributed hash table (DHT) in the network 
and decide independently whether they wish to store the 
data as a copy. Since it is trivial to run an IPFS client 
that delivers the data, every FX participant enhances the 
network; therefore, it scales sufficiently. To further val-
idate this claim, we created a server running an IPFS 
node in the USA and an IPFS node in Germany. On the 
server in the USA, we created 1,000 random files with a 
size of 200 kB, which corresponds to around 50 pages 
of a PDF file. We added the files to the IPFS and then 
tried to download them in Germany via the IPFS proto-
col. This was possible with a short delay that often lasted 
only a few seconds but did not exceed 2 minutes. The 
time required to find the file depended on how well the 
peers were connected and how many other peers were 
already storing the file. The transfer was instant when 
the two peers exchanging the files were connected di-
rectly. Additionally, we reviewed a study on the IPFS 
performance [39], which shows that for our small file 
sizes, the scalability of the IPFS is sufficient. 
Table 2 Results of the experiment on IOTA. 
In Ethereum, the capacity is limited by the gas consump-
tion allowed while creating a block, which is constantly 
adjusted by the Ethereum community. The highest num-
ber of transactions achieved in one day was 1.3 million 
in January 2018. The current rate is around 0.6 million 
transactions, indicating that the network retains some 







Create contract 60.8  0.043€ 0.086€ 
Release payment by V 36.5  0.026€ 0.052€ 
batch of two 52.0  0.037€ 0.074€ 
batch of four  79.5  0.056€ 0.113€ 
Registration carrier / V 268.8  0.191€ 0.381€ 
Registration shipper 304.3  0.216€ 0.431€ 
Exception handling 
   
request money (C-> S) 47.9  0.034€ 0.068€ 
obtain money (C-> S) 42.3  0.030€ 0.060€ 
stake (S-> C) 51.6  0.037€ 0.073€ 
claim stake (S-> C) 38.5  0.027€ 0.055€ 
Add service request list 191.7  0.136€ 0.272€ 
Create FX 4,460  3.163€ 6.325€ 
Requests for offers / s Number of instances 
0.79 2x c4.8xlarge 
1.41 4x c4.8xlarge 
2.62 8x c4.8xlarge 
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currently around 45 × 109 per day with peaks reaching 
60 × 109. For the naïve case, the contract creation and 
release of payments for around 100,000 transactions 
would be possible with a gas usage of 10 × 109, which 
would fit into the gap and could be handled by the block-
chain. Around 20%1 more transactions would be ena-
bled by releasing the payments in batches, as the cost of 
21,000 gas [48] for calling a smart contract would occur 
only once. No data is available regarding how much 
freight is processed per day on current FX. Some ex-
changes publish the number of daily offers with no ref-
erence to time (when the number was achieved; how 
many contracts were closed; maximum vs. average per 
day). Considering these numbers, the median is around 
100,000 shipments per day. Conducting the test runs on 
the Ethereum main net would provide minimal insight, 
since it is already known that the protocol is constrained 
in terms of capacity, and this would also be costly. Fur-
thermore, tests on the test net or a private Ethereum 
blockchain, which we have conducted, would not be in-
sightful, because these have other characteristics. 
The blockchains involved are robust and stable. Altering 
their reliability might be difficult, as the nodes compris-
ing them are distributed around the world. Ethereum has 
over 3,500 and IOTA more than 150 active nodes; for 
the IPFS, it would be trivial to run a node that only 
serves the local content on users’ computers. 
5.2. Privacy 
Preserving anonymity is important. Both the shipper and 
carrier can create as many accounts as they wish in the 
Ethereum blockchain. None of the accounts is required 
to be bound to an identity. Thus, for a third party con-
sidering the transactions on the chain, it is impossible to 
determine identities. Only the parties involved in a 
transaction see the identity of their counterpart. Ulti-
mately, not even the shipper is required to be identified, 
since the carrier only requires to know that they will be 
paid. However, if a shipper wishes to be more confident 
that the carrier will conduct the service appropriately, 
they could ask the carrier to show them successful con-
tracts on the blockchain. This could be simply achieved, 
since the carrier could sign a proof with the key used for 
the transactions. A service automating this process 
could be another opportunity for extending the FX with-
out changing the protocol and thus increasing trust. 
This study did not address the exchange of tokens for 
fiat money, since exchanges exist that provide this ser-
vice. By observing the tokens, one might deduct the 
identities of the Cs when they are exchanged into fiat 
money. However, exchanges often have random 
 
1 𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑛) = 52006 + (𝑛 − 2) ∗ 13763 + 𝑛 ∗
60754; 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒(𝑛) = 𝑛 ∗ (36528 + 60754); with 𝑛 =
addresses to send the tokens to that only they can con-
nect to an owner. Additionally, the token exchange 
could offer an off-chain service that would directly ex-
change tokens locked in contracts, leaving no traces on 
the public chain. The account owner could easily prove 
that they own the coins using a public key mechanism. 
Moreover, tokens could be exchanged between Cs and 
Ss, since the Ss generally require tokens and the Cs have 
them. This represents another opportunity to extend the 
architecture. 
5.3. Extensibility 
It would also be possible to integrate loans to finance 
transport via tokens. Services for this already exist in the 
Ethereum ecosystem. Other BLOB stores could be used 
without changing the protocol. While maintaining a sta-
ble management layer, the negotiation layer could be ex-
tended using a different blockchain, since in the archi-
tecture, the link from the service request list repository 
can point to any type of target.  
The protocol does not prescribe how the validator 
should be implemented. It only provides an interface 
that enables arbitrary validator implementations. Other 
even more automated validators could be implemented 
with a GPS tracking device attached to the shipment. 
Once the device enters the destination, it can call a val-
idator to trigger release of the payment. Another exten-
sion might be an insurance that would act as a validator. 
When signing a contract, the shipper would pay the in-
surance validator while enabling it to access information 
about the shipment. If the cargo did not arrive, all the 
required information would be available to the insurance 
to allow the losses to be covered. 
6. Discussion 
An ELM on a blockchain replaces the TP as one of three 
participants [45] with technology. In Wang’s model the 
TP involves cost for the participants. The blockchain 
model enables an infrastructure with fewer overheads, 
since the TP is not involved. Our architecture enables 
the shippers but not the TP to choose between an open 
or closed ELM or even to use both. Wang [46] argues 
that this would be desirable, as this would enable effi-
ciency and economies of scale (closed) and flexibility 
and speed (open). Our architecture enables the partici-
pants to work in centralized markets and heterarchical 
ELMs depending on the requirements. 
The roles in the blockchain ELM do not need to be 
fixed, as a C can be a carrier in one list and a shipper in 
a different list, utilizing their network to resell orders 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 and 𝑛 ≥ 2; for 𝑛 → ∞, 23,4% gas can be 
saved 
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enabling multimodal transport, as our architecture does 
not restrict this. Föhring [12] adds the problem of find-
ing a neutral TP for the FX and suggests an agent-based 
system as a solution. Here, our blockchain architecture 
might provide a suitable infrastructure on which to run 
the agent-based system. 
The blockchain enables better process digitalization, as 
all phases of the EM are implemented on one technology 
layer, giving better cost efficiency in contrast to the in-
formation phase alone [38]. Electronic logistics market-
places threaten the business of traditional freight for-
warders [38]. These often buy capacity on the market 
and therefore function as another intermediary, like the 
ELM. When the ELM is on a blockchain, no single party 
directly gains from higher usage of the ELM; therefore, 
it changes from a competitor to an infrastructure. Carri-
ers fear transparency through ELMs [13, 38], leading to 
lower prices. This effect may not be influenced by the 
change in the underlying technology; however, further 
research is required. 
To achieve scalability and privacy, we separated the 
three areas: smart contracts, negotiation data, and file 
storage. This implies a design compromise, since having 
all the data in one system would make it possible to en-
sure that participants follow the rules, since the smart 
contracts control every transaction. The compromise is 
ultimately smaller than it appears. Although a S could 
create arbitrary contracts and collect the deposited 
money from the Cs, this might result in loss of trust from 
the Cs because of the immutable transaction log. 
Considering the technologies used, some limitations re-
main. Although we heavily optimized the protocol, 
Ethereum remains a limiting factor in terms of scalabil-
ity. Further developments on Ethereum 2.0 are in pro-
gress, which should allow much improved scalability. 
7. Conclusions 
Freight exchanges are important instruments in the lo-
gistics industry, as they avoid empty runs and meet spot 
demands. However, they have many drawbacks, such as 
lack of automation, lack of transparency, difficulty in 
extending, high cost, and lack of trust between partici-
pants. This study shows how these issues can be over-
come by creating a FX on public blockchains, while 
maintaining the scalability of the solution and the re-
quired data privacy. As blockchains have their own 
shortcomings, such as scalability and privacy, we ex-
tracted three research questions. These were addressed 
by creating two artifacts in a DSR process and evaluat-
ing the results. We thoroughly analyzed the scalability 
aspect of the solution during the evaluation. Addition-
ally, the exchange should be open not only to partici-
pants but also to third parties who wish to extend it. We 
showed examples of how this can be achieved with this 
architecture. Since trust is a crucial aspect when moving 
freight, we also elaborated on how trust is enhanced 
with the decentralized FX. We provide a blueprint for 
building decentralized, scalable, privacy-aware, and ex-
tensible ELMs that can act as an infrastructure for the 
logistics community. 
8. References 
[1] Ali, M.S., et al., "Iot Data Privacy Via Blockchains and 
Ipfs", Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference on 
the Internet of Things, 2017, pp. Article 14. 
[2] Bakos, J.Y., "A Strategic Analysis of Electronic 
Marketplaces", MIS Quarterly, 15(3), 1991, pp. 295-310. 
[3] Beck, R., et al., "Blockchain – the Gateway to Trust-Free 
Cryptographic Transactions", European Conference on 
Information Systems (ECIS), 2016 
[4] Benet, J., "Ipfs - Content Addressed, Versioned, P2p File 
System", arXiv preprint arXiv:1407.3561(1), 2014, pp. 1–11. 
[5] Burges, D., Cargo Theft, Loss Prevention, and Supply 
Chain Security, Butterworth-Heinemann,  2012. 
[6] Buterin, V., "Ethereum White Paper: A Next Generation 
Smart Contract and Decentralized Application Platform.", 
https://github.com/ethereum/wiki/wiki/White-Paper, accessed 
19.01.2020. 
[7] Caplice, C., "Electronic Markets for Truckload 
Transportation", Production and Operations Management, 
16(4), 2007, pp. 423-436. 
[8] Christidis, K. and Devetsikiotis, M., "Blockchains and 
Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things", Ieee Access, 4(1), 
2016, pp. 2292-2303. 
[9] Daemen, J. and Rijmen, V., Aes Proposal: Rijndael1999. 
[10] Dvz, "Weltweite Ebit-Margen Ausgewählter 
Logistikkonzerne Im Bereich Landverkehr in Den Jahren 2016 
Bis 2018.", https://statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/829977/, 
accessed 15.04.2020. 
[11] Eurostat, "Summary of Annual Road Freight Transport 
by Type of Operation and Type of Transport", 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=road_go_ta_tott, 
accessed 02.12.2019. 
[12] Föhring, R. and Zelewski, S., "Towards Decentralized 
Electronic Market Places and Agent-Based Freight Exchanges 
for Multimodal Transports", 11th IEEE International 
Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, CASE 
2015, 2015, pp. 249-254. 
[13] Goldsby, T.J. and Eckert, J.A., "Electronic Transportation 
Marketplaces: A Transaction Cost Perspective", Industrial 
Marketing Management, 32(3), 2003, pp. 187-198. 
[14] Gregor, S. and Hevner, A., "Positioning and Presenting 
Design Science Research for Maximum Impact", MIS 
Quarterly, 37(2), 2013, pp. 337-355. 
[15] Grieger, M., "Electronic Marketplaces: A Literature 
Review and a Call for Supply Chain Management Research", 
European Journal of Operational Research, 144(2), 2003, pp. 
280-294. 
[16] Guggenmos, F., et al., "How to Develop a Gdpr-
Compliant Blockchain Solution for Cross-Organizational 
Workflow Management: Evidence from the German Asylum 
Procedure", 53th Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, 2019 
Page 5595
[17] Hevner, A., et al., "Design Science in Information 
Systems Research", Management Information Systems 
Quarterly, 28, 2004, pp. 75. 
[18] Kabi, O.R. and Franqueira, V.N.L., "Blockchain-Based 
Distributed Marketplace", 21st International Conference on 
Business Information Systems, BIS 2018, 2019, pp. 197-210. 
[19] Kleedorfer, F. and Huemer, C., "Towards a Web Based 
Transportation Infrastructure", e Hamburg International 
Conference of Logistics (HICL) – 23, 2017 
[20] Klems, M., et al., "Trustless Intermediation in 
Blockchain-Based Decentralized Service Marketplaces", 15th 
International Conference on Service-Oriented Computing, 
ICSOC 2017, 2017, pp. 731-739. 
[21] Koblitz, N., "Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems", 
Mathematics of computation, 48(177), 1987, pp. 203-209. 
[22] Kosba, A., et al., "Hawk: The Blockchain Model of 
Cryptography and Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts", 2016 
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), 2016, pp. 
839-858. 
[23] Liu, D., et al., "Anonymous Reputation System for Iiot-
Enabled Retail Marketing Atop Pos Blockchain", IEEE 
Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 15, 2019, pp. 3527-
3537. 
[24] Marathe, A., et al., "Dinemmo: Decentralized 
Incentivization for Enterprise Marketplace Models", 25th 
IEEE International Conference on High Performance 
Computing Workshops, HiPCW 2018, 2019, pp. 95-100. 
[25] Min, H., "Blockchain Technology for Enhancing Supply 
Chain Resilience", Business Horizons, 62, 2018, pp. 35-45. 
[26] Nakamoto, S., Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash 
System, Cryptography Mailing list at https://metzdowd.com, 
2009. 
[27] Notheisen, B., et al., "Trading Real-World Assets on 
Blockchain an Application of Trust-Free Transaction Systems 
in the Market for Lemons", Business & Information Systems 
Engineering, 59(6), 2017, pp. 425-440. 
[28] Ozyilmaz, K.R., et al., "Idmob: Iot Data Marketplace on 
Blockchain", 2018 Crypto Valley Conference on Blockchain 
Technology, CVCBT 2018, 2018, pp. 11-19. 
[29] Pedersen, A., et al., "A Ten-Step Decision Path to 
Determine When to Use Blockchain Technologies", MIS 
Quarterly Executive, 18(2), 2019, pp. 99-115. 
[30] Poelstra, A., et al., "Confidential Assets", International 
Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security, 
2017 
[31] Popov, S., "The Tangle", 
https://iota.org/IOTA_Whitepaper.pdf, accessed 15.04.2020. 
[32] Regner, F., et al., "Nfts in Practice – Non-Fungible 
Tokens as Core Component of a Blockchain-Based Event 
Ticketing Application", International Conference on 
Information Systems, 2019 
[33] Riedl, J., et al., "Why Road Freight Needs to Go Digital - 
Fast", accessed 03.12.2019. 
[34] Romano, D. and Schmid, G., "Beyond Bitcoin: A Critical 
Look at Blockchain-Based Systems", Cryptography, 1, 2017, 
pp. 15. 
[35] Routledge, B. and Zetlin-Jones, A., Currency Stability 
Using Blockchain Technology, No 1160, Meeting Papers, 
Society for Economic Dynamics, 2018. 
[36] Scharl, A., Evolutionary Web Development, Springer 
Science & Business Media,  2012. 
[37] Schmid, B.F. and Lindemann, M.A., "Elements of a 
Reference Model for Electronic Markets", Proceedings of the 
Thirty-First Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, 1998, pp. 193-201 vol.194. 
[38] Schwind, M., et al., "Electronic Transportation 
Marketplaces: How Can Green-Is Help to Promote 
Sustainable Logistics?", 2011 44th Hawaii International 
Conference on System Sciences, 2011, pp. 1-8. 
[39] Shen, J., et al., "Understanding I/O Performance of Ipfs 
Storage: A Client’s Perspective", Proceedings of the 
International Symposium on Quality of Service, 2019, pp. 
Article 17. 
[40] Skjøtt-Larsen, T., et al., "Electronic Marketplaces and 
Supply Chain Relationships", Industrial Marketing 
Management, 32(3), 2003, pp. 199-210. 
[41] Soska, K., et al., "Beaver: A Decentralized Anonymous 
Marketplace with Secure Reputation", IACR Cryptology 
ePrint Archive, 2016, 2016, pp. 464. 
[42] Szabo, N., "Smart Contracts", Unpublished manuscript, 
1994 
[43] Van Moergeste, L., et al., "Using Blockchains for Agent-
Based Auctions", 10th International Conference on Agents 
and Artificial Intelligence, ICAART 2018, 2018, pp. 192-199. 
[44] Wang, Y. and Naim, M.M., "B2b E-Business Reference 
Architecture for Tailored Logistics", International Journal of 
Services Operations and Informatics, 2(3), 2007, pp. 253-266. 
[45] Wang, Y., et al., "Electronic Marketplaces for Tailored 
Logistics", Industrial Management and Data Systems, 107(8), 
2007, pp. 1170-1187. 
[46] Wang, Y., et al., "An Exploratory Study of Electronic 
Logistics Marketplaces and Its Impact on Customised 
Logistics", POMS 18th Annual Conference Dallas, Texas, 
USA, May, 2007 
[47] Witkowski, J., "Electronic Freight Exchange and 
Logistics Platforms in Building of Supply Chains", CLC 2018: 
Carpathian Logistics Congress: Conference Proceedings, 
2018, pp. 77. 
[48] Wood, G., "Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised 
Generalised Transaction Ledger", 
https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf, accessed 
19.01.2020. 
[49] Wüst, K. and Gervais, A., "Do You Need a Blockchain?", 
2018 Crypto Valley Conference on Blockchain Technology 
(CVCBT), 2018, pp. 45-54. 
[50] Xu, X., et al., "The Blockchain as a Software Connector", 
2016 13th Working IEEE/IFIP Conference on Software 
Architecture, 2016, pp. 182-191. 
[51] Xu, X., et al., "A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based 
Systems for Architecture Design", 2017 IEEE International 
Conference on Software Architecture (ICSA), 2017, pp. 243-
252. 
[52] Zheng, Q., et al., "An Innovative Ipfs-Based Storage 
Model for Blockchain", 2018 IEEE/WIC/ACM International 
Conference on Web Intelligence (WI), 2018, pp. 704-708. 
[53] Zheng, Z., et al., "An Overview of Blockchain 
Technology: Architecture, Consensus, and Future Trends", 
2017 IEEE International Congress on Big Data (BigData 
Congress), 2017, pp. 557-564. 
[54] Zyskind, G., et al., "Enigma: Decentralized Computation 
Platform with Guaranteed Privacy", arXiv, 1506.03471v1(1), 
2015, pp. 1-14. 
Page 5596
